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Abstract How can the internal governance of civil society organizations be
conceptualized more adequately by accounting for the dual and simultaneous
requirements of controlling and coaching in board behavior? Empirically, we seem
to agree that effective governance of a civil society organization is crucial to its
sustained viability. Conceptually, however, we observe a lack of consensus on how
to best understand CSO governance. By critically juxtaposing two major theoretical
lenses to conceptualize governance, namely, agency and stewardship theory, we
identify a number of challenges when dealing with board–management relations
that deserve our attention. While agency theory privileges controlling behavior,
stewardship theory emphasizes the coaching behavior of boards. The purpose of this
article is to offer a concept of governance that is informed by a paradox perspective
advancing a subtler, more adequate conceptualization of board governance that
accounts for these often conflicting demands on CSO governance. Drawing on
illustrations from a longitudinal interpretive case study, we exemplify our propo-
sitions empirically. The article concludes with discussing the implications of our
argument for CSO governance research and practice.
Re´sume´ Comment la gouvernance interne des organisations de la socie´te´ civile
peut-elle eˆtre conceptualise´e de manie`re plus ade´quate par la prise en compte des
exigences simultane´es et doubles de controˆle et d’encadrement quant a` l’interven-
tion du conseil d’administration ? Il semble que de manie`re empirique, nous con-
venions qu’une gouvernance efficace d’une organisation de la socie´te´ civile est
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cruciale pour sa viabilite´ durable. Cependant, d’un point de vue conceptuel, nous
observons une absence de consensus sur la meilleure compre´hension qui soit de la
gouvernance d’une OSC. Graˆce a` la juxtaposition critique de deux approches
the´oriques majeures afin de conceptualiser la gouvernance, a` savoir les the´ories de
l’agence et de l’intendance, nous identifions un certain nombre de difficulte´s dans le
cadre du traitement des relations conseil d’administration-direction qui nous inte´-
ressent. Alors que la the´orie de l’agence privile´gie une conduite de controˆle, la
the´orie de l’intendance met l’accent sur la conduite d’encadrement des conseils
d’administration. L’objet de cet article est de proposer un concept de gouvernance
e´labore´ a` partir d’une approche paradoxale e´nonc¸ant une conceptualisation plus
subtile et ade´quate de la gouvernance du conseil d’administration et justifiant ces
exigences souvent conflictuelles de la gouvernance d’une OSC. Nous fondant sur
des exemples issus d’une e´tude de cas d’interpre´tation longitudinale, nous illustrons
nos propositions de manie`re empirique. L’article se conclut par une discussion sur
les implications de notre argument pour la recherche et la pratique de la gouver-
nance d’une OSC.
Zusammenfassung Wie kann die interne Leitung von Bu¨rgergesellschaften unter
Beru¨cksichtigung der Kontrolle und des Coachings im Vorstandsverhalten, beides
gleichermaßen wichtige Anforderungen, begrifflich besser erfasst werden? Empir-
isch betrachtet scheint Einigkeit daru¨ber zu herrschen, dass die effektive Leitung
einer Bu¨rgergesellschaft fu¨r ihr nachhaltiges Bestehen ausschlaggebend ist. Auf
begrifflicher Ebene jedoch ist man sich nicht einig daru¨ber, wie die Leitung einer
Bu¨rgergesellschaft am besten zu verstehen ist. Indem wir zwei bedeutende theo-
retische Betrachtungsweisen zur begrifflichen Erfassung der Leitung, na¨mlich die
Agency-Theorie und die Stewardship-Theorie, einander kritisch gegenu¨berstellen,
identifizieren wir eine Anzahl von Problemen, die sich im Zusammenhang mit der
Beziehung zwischen Vorstand und Management stellen und die unsere
Aufmerksamkeit verdienen. Wa¨hrend die Agency-Theorie die Kontrolle privilegi-
ert, konzentriert sich die Stewardship-Theorie auf das Coaching-Verhalten der
Vorsta¨nde. Zweck dieses Beitrags ist die Bereitstellung eines Leitungskonzepts, das
von einer paradoxen Perspektive gepra¨gt wird, die eine subtilere und angemessenere
begriffliche Erfassung der Vorstandsleitung fo¨rdert, welche die oftmals wide-
rspru¨chlichen Forderungen an die Leitung der Bu¨rgergesellschaft beru¨cksichtigt.
Wir stu¨tzen uns auf Illustrationen einer interpretativen La¨ngsschnittfallstudie und
unterbreiten empirisch veranschaulichte Vorschla¨ge. Der Beitrag endet mit einer
Diskussion der Schlussfolgerungen unserer Argumentation fu¨r die Erforschung und
Praktik der Leitung von Bu¨rgergesellschaften.
Resumen >Co´mo puede conceptualizarse la gobernanza interna de las organiz-
aciones de la sociedad civil (OSC) de manera ma´s adecuada dando cuenta de los
requisitos duales y simulta´neos de controlar el comportamiento del consejo y en-
trenar sobre e´l? Empı´ricamente, parece que estamos de acuerdo en que la gober-
nanza efectiva de una organizacio´n de la sociedad civil es crucial para su viabilidad
sostenida. Conceptualmente, sin embargo, observamos una falta de consenso sobre
co´mo comprender mejor la gobernanza de las OSC. Mediante la yuxtaposicio´n
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crı´tica de dos lentes teo´ricas importantes para conceptualizar la gobernanza, a saber,
la teorı´a de la agencia y de la administracio´n, identificamos una serie de desafı´os
cuando tratamos las relaciones del consejo de administracio´n que merecen nuestra
atencio´n. Mientras que la teorı´a de la agencia da prioridad al control del compor-
tamiento, la teorı´a de la administracio´n hace hincapie´ en el comportamiento de
entrenamiento de los consejos. El propo´sito de este documento es ofrecer un con-
cepto de gobernanza que este´ informado mediante una perspectiva parado´jica
avanzando una conceptualizacio´n ma´s sutil, ma´s adecuada de la gobernanza del
consejo que explique estas demandas a menudo conflictivas sobre la gobernanza de
las OSC. Recurriendo a ejemplos de un estudio de caso longitudinal interpretativo,
demostramos nuestras propuestas empı´ricamente. El documento concluye tratando
las implicaciones de nuestra argumentacio´n para la investigacio´n y pra´ctica de la
gobernanza de las OSC.
Keywords CSO governance  Agency theory  Stewardship theory 
Paradox perspective
Introduction
A wide range of theoretical perspectives have been advanced to explain, understand,
and model the challenges of governance—and especially board–management
relations—in civil society organizations (Ostrower and Stone 2006), including:
agency theory (e.g., Harris 1989; Jegers 2009; Miller 2002; Olson 2000);
stewardship theory (Alexander and Weiner 1998; Jeavons 1994); contingency
theory (Bradshaw 2009; Ostrower and Stone 2010); or a combination of agency,
resource dependency, and institutional theory (Miller-Millesen 2003). Individually,
however, each theory offers only a partial view of CSO governance—at the expense
of others (Cornforth 2004). It seems that none of the aforementioned theories has
successfully provided a comprehensive view on CSO governance. Thus, despite the
empirical relevance of the issue, effective governance of civil society organizations
remains conceptually under-theorized and empirically under-explored. Moreover,
the competing theoretical perspectives seem to have prevented scholars from
acknowledging and integrating aspects that the supposedly competing approach
might offer. The purpose of this article is to offer a concept of governance that is
informed by a paradox perspective and in this way it advances a subtler, more
adequate conceptualization of board governance that accounts for the often
conflicting demands on CSO governance solutions. Thus, in an attempt to strive for
a more integrated view of CSO governance, we ask: How can governance of civil
society organizations be conceptualized more adequately by accounting for the
simultaneous requirements of controlling and coaching behavior?
The article is structured as follows. First, we review the state of the art of CSO
governance research to specify and motivate our research question. Second, we
juxtapose agency and stewardship theory as the two dominant source theories in
governance research. We theorize on the paradox of the board’s role as controlling
or supporting management and exemplify our theoretical considerations by drawing
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on a longitudinal case study. Finally, we critically discuss our findings and
implications for CSO governance theory, research, and practice.
Background: State of the Art of CSO Governance Research
Theoretical Approaches to CSO Governance
Empirically, the governance of civil society organizations often entails fulfilling
legal and fiduciary responsibilities, most particularly the need for the board of
directors to comply with duty of care, duty of loyalty standards, and the duty of
obedience (Brody 2002; Ostrower and Stone 2006). It could thus be argued that
boards of civil society organizations hold the ultimate accountability for organi-
zational action (Carver 1990). CSO governance involves a number of roles and
responsibilities (Harris 1998; Herman and Renz 1997, 2000; Houle 1989; Kramer
1981; Miller-Millesen 2003; Ostrower and Stone 2006; Stone and Ostrower 2007),
such as strategic planning and budgeting, selecting and reviewing of CEO,
overseeing financial management, defining and reviewing of mission, establishing a
working relationship between board and staff, and representing the organization to
key constituencies and public relations. How has this been conceptualized in theory
to date?
Even though most CSO governance studies operate on a surprisingly agnostic
approach as far as their underlying theory of governance is concerned, we focus on
and juxtapose what we consider to be the two major source theories explicitly or
implicitly underpinning CSO governance research, namely, agency and stewardship
theory.
Most generally, agency theory is based on the concept of the economic man, lack
of full information, and an assumption of behavioral opportunism of actors (Fama
and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). The fundamental premise of agency
theory is goal incongruence between the owners of an enterprise (the principals) and
its managers (the agents), who have different interests (e.g., maximizing short-term
income of the manager; long-term growth for the owners). From a micro-economic
perspective, it addresses the issues arising from incomplete information and thus the
control of the principal, and assumed opportunistic behavior of the manager in terms
of exploiting this asymmetry for his or her advantage. The owners or shareholders of
an enterprise face the problem that managers are likely to act in their own interest
rather than in that of the shareholders. Agency theory thus assumes a concept of man
which includes extrinsic motivation and opportunistic behavior of managers (Davis
et al. 1997).
Consequently, agency theory suggests that the primary function of a board is to
ensure managerial compliance (Fama and Jensen 1983), and the suggested board
behavior is to monitor and control management to ensure it acts in the principal’s
interest. In such a framework, the establishment of an independent board of
directors consisting of legal outsiders is one of the mechanisms that exist to ensure
the alignment between the interests of managers and ‘‘principals’’ (Fama and Jensen
1983). The corresponding motivational consequences are to incentivize and sanction
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management through monitoring and reward systems of tangible, exchangeable
commodities that have measurable ‘‘market value’’ (Davis et al. 1997). Despite
some criticism regarding its behavioral assumptions (Hirsch et al. 1990), agency
theory remains the main source theory in for-profit governance scholarship.
Implying a universal relevance and applicability of agency theory, effective
board behavior in CSO settings is modeled accordingly in terms of a controlling and
monitoring role (Miller 2002). Thus, boards are suggested to ensure that directors
have the right set of incentives to make the right decisions for the organization
(Carver 1990; Fama and Jensen 1983; Harris 1989; Oster 1995). For instance,
Miller-Millesen (2003) suggested that CSO boards are more likely to engage in
monitoring activities when the organization is stable, and that they are less likely to
engage in monitoring behaviors when the executive staff is professionalized.
However, for CSO governance, agency theory has been criticized as being a
‘‘managerial’’ (read: for-profit) concept that might apply to for-profits but not
beyond. Conceptually, CSO scholars question whether incongruence in goals exists
between managers and the board as well as strong opportunistic behavior of CSO
managers might be adequate assumptions. Handy and Katz (1998) suggest a kind of
self-selection process for managers as civil society organizations attract committed
managers; thus, principal-agent problems are partially resolved. Du Bois et al.
(2009) analyzed a sample of 503 primary school managers, 187 secondary school
managers, and 171 board chairpersons and found little differences in objectives
between board and management. On a related note, some authors (Ben-Ner and Van
Hoomissen 1994; Miller 2002; Oster 1995) question whether the board in a civil
society organization can be regarded as ‘‘principal’’ in the sense of the principal-
agent theory as there are no owners or stockholders to represent and protect and no
market to provide additional safeguards. Another point of contention is grounded in
the ability to measure and incentivize goal-congruent behavior in CSOs. Due to the
non-distribution constraint and the lack of coherent measures of managerial
performance in CSOs, it might not be possible to control managers through
incentive structures of ownership (Steinberg 1987).
Despite the legitimate concerns, we believe that agency theory raises a number of
relevant questions for CSO governance and board behavior but might not provide
perfect answers.
Thus, in seeking a more adequate theoretical approach to conceptualize
governance, scholars have turned to stewardship theory, which stresses the
empowerment of managers (stewards) of the organization and strong ties between
board and management (Davis et al. 1997). The fundamental premise of stewardship
theory is goal congruence between management and board as it assumes that the
shared mission leads to aligned behavior of managers (‘‘agents’’ in the principal-
agent theory). Stewardship theory advocates an essentially different concept of man
than agency theory, assuming that intrinsically motivated and responsible managers
will indeed act as compliant stewards of the organization and its assets as they
strongly identify with the organization’s mission (Davis et al. 1997). Stewardship
theory—firmly grounded in a human relations perspective (Hung 1998)—operates
from a collaborative assumption that managers want to do a good job. Thus, the
suggested board behavior is to take on a strategic role of supporting management to
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achieve the organization’s mission by operating as a collaborative partner with the
management (Donaldson 1990). The corresponding motivational consequences are
to empower management through intrinsic rewards, such as opportunities for
growth, achievement, affiliation, and self-actualization. Subordinates in a steward-
ship relationship are reinforced by these intrinsic, intangible rewards and are
motivated to work harder on behalf of the organization (Davis et al. 1997).
Drawing on stewardship theory for governance, Wood (1992) suggests that
effective boards also play a supportive and even operational role. For instance,
board members assist management in fundraising activities and act as ‘‘boundary
spanners’’ in connecting the organization with important players in its environment
(Cornforth 2003). Stewardship theory emphasizes the strategic role of CSO boards
in terms of collaboratively striving to achieve the CSO’s mission (Cornforth 2003;
Van Slyke 2006). Similarly, Jeavons (1994) suggests that boards should not just be
‘‘financial overseers’’ (read: principals) but act as the collective conscience of their
organization and be concerned about all aspects of the organization’s life and
mission.
Stewardship theory obviously resonates with behavioral assumptions of CSO
actors and in this respect assumes a collaborative relationship between board and
management. Nevertheless, it implies congruence in values, beliefs, and goals
between manager and board or organization that seems a useful but in practice,
rarely achievable ideal. Thus, existing research emphasizes how agency theory—
advancing more controlling behavior of boards—and stewardship theory—suggest-
ing more coaching behavior—differ in their fundamental premises.
Agency theory assumes an extrinsic motivation of managers, while stewardship
theory claims the opposite in terms of non-monetary aspects such as opportunities
for growth, achievement, affiliation, and self-actualization. Thus, managerial
approaches to CSO governance most likely correspond to the assumptions of
agency theory emphasizing the similarities in motivation structure and information
asymmetries between for- and non-profit environments (e.g., Glaeser 2003; Jegers
2009; Miller-Millesen 2003; Slivinski 2002).
In contrast, more mission-driven CSO management concepts highlight how third
sector organizations are fundamentally different from the for-profit world, assuming
an involvement-oriented environment and managers that are highly motivated by
the mission of the organization. For example, Handy and Katz (1998) assume that
CSO managers have intrinsic motivation to pursue the organization’s goals. As a
consequence, civil society organizations appear to attract individuals with a strong
commitment and loyalty to the mission of the organization and who are willing to
subordinate interest in monetary gains (Callen and Falk 1993; Mirvis and Hackett
1983; Weisbrod 1983; Young 1983). These authors highlight that in civil society
organizations, the training and empowerment of managers are more important than
control, assuming that personal goals are subordinate to organizational goals.
Table 1 juxtaposes the two approaches according to key dimensions to exemplify
these considerations.
So far, scholars seem to have struggled with reconciling, let alone integrating,
these two distinct, often assumed antagonistic, theoretical perspectives on CSO
governance. For instance, Caers et al. (2006) conceptualize stewardship theory as a
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special case of agency theory in civil society organizations. They argue that
stewardship differs from traditional agency theory only in terms of challenging the
assumption that a governance relationship will always be characterized by agency
conflicts. Caers et al. (2006) assume goal incongruence as a premise of stewardship
theory (p. 29), which—in our view—risks to inadequately equate the fundamental
premises of agency and stewardship theory by claiming stewardship as an ‘extreme’
case of agency theory. Most commonly, the literature assumes the two theoretical
perspectives to be fundamentally and distinctively different (Davis et al. 1997;
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003). In particular, proponents of the ‘strong
distinctiveness’ view emphasize the goal conflict between principal and agent—
which is the most fundamental assumption of agency theory (Eisenhardt 1985)—as
not being a fundamental premise of stewardship theory. Consequently, these
scholars conclude that the two theories operate from distinctively different ‘‘models
of man’’ (Davis et al. 1997).
While we appreciate Caers et al.’s (2006) suggestion to conceptualize agency and
stewardship theory as a continuum (spanning along a ‘‘stewardship-agency axis’’,
p. 30), we offer an alternative approach by arguing that these two perspectives
should not be looked at as mutually exclusive (‘‘either/nor’’) but as simultaneous
Table 1 Juxtaposing key tenets of agency and stewardship theory in CSOs
Agency theory Stewardship theory
Fundamental
premise
Goal incongruence between management
and board; systematic information
asymmetry to be exploited by
opportunistic agent (=manager)
Goal congruence between management
and board; shared mission leads to
aligned behavior of agent (=manager)
Concept of
man
Opportunistic behavior of management Compliant behavior of management
Extrinsic motivation of agents Intrinsic, value-driven motivation of
agents
Suggested
board
behavior
Control the behavior of agents Strategic role, support management to
achieve the organization’s mission
Motivational
consequence
Incentivize and sanction through
monitoring, reward systems
Empower and reward through
opportunities for growth, achievement,
affiliation, and self-actualization
Concept of
CSO
Managerial concept of CSO Mission-driven concept of CSO
Assumes similarity/identity between CSOs
and for-profit organizations
Assumes systematic differences between
CSOs and for-profit organizations
Typical foci
of CSO
scholarship
Separation of control and management
in CSOs
Reward managers through non-monetary
mechanisms
Differences in objectives between board
and management
Self-selection of CSO managers
Performance-based remuneration schemes
for CSO managers
Problems with the adoption of corporate
governance models in CSOs
(‘‘corporatization of the third sector’’)
Who is the principal in CSOs?
Exemplary
articles
(Jegers 2009; Miller-Millesen 2003;
Miller 2002; Olson 2000)
(Alexander and Weiner 1998; Jeavons
1994)
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requirements in terms of time and logic. Simultaneity of supposedly contradicting,
mutually excluding aspects is at the core of the Greek notion of paradox.
As Table 1 suggests, CSO governance as an empirical phenomenon can be
looked at from different theoretical perspectives—with each view highlighting
certain (and hiding other) aspects. We believe that both approaches provide valuable
aspects, ideas, and questions. Ultimately, we need both controlling as well as
coaching behavior and often at the same time. Yet neither seems to adequately
model CSO governance. Rather than a naı¨ve integration of these perspectives, we
suggest considering a paradox perspective in advancing CSO governance scholar-
ship. As we will discuss in more detail below, the concept of paradox refers to a
statement consisting of two claims that simultaneously exclude each other.
‘‘Paradox’’ denotes contradictory, yet interrelated elements—elements that seem
logical in isolation but absurd and incompatible when appearing simultaneously
(Lewis 2000). Regarding CSO governance, a paradox perspective explores how
simultaneous controlling and coaching behavior can be conceptualized.
The Paradoxical Quest for CSO Boards: To Coach and to Control—
Simultaneously
Paradox theory describes and acknowledges conflicting demands, opposing
perspectives, or seemingly contradictory terms (Lewis 2000). Tensions, the
underlying sources of paradox, stem from perceptions of opposing and interwoven
elements. Stressing one polarity exacerbates the need for the other, often sparking
defensive responses, impeding learning, and engendering counterproductive rein-
forcing cycles (Lewis 2000). To manage a paradox aims at embracing and exploring
tensions and differences between two opposites rather than choosing between them
and involves developing practices that accept and accommodate tensions. For
example, the tension between board members acting as representatives of particular
membership groups on the one hand and experts charged with driving the
performance of the organization forward, on the other hand (Kreutzer 2009), or the
tension between the contrasting board roles of controlling and supporting
management (Cornforth 2004; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003) in civil society
organizations have not received adequate attention in research thus far. The paradox
of controlling versus supporting represents, in our opinion, the key challenge for
CSO boards as it portrays the nexus between managerial and mission-driven
concepts of CSO governance.
Thus, the two orthogonal concepts that constitute the paradox for CSO board
behavior are controlling on the one hand and coaching on the other. We refer to
control broadly as any mechanism that board members use to direct attention,
motivate, and encourage managers to act in desired ways to meet an organization’s
objectives (Cardinal 2001; Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1977; Sitkin et al. 2010).
Existing research on control differentiates between formal and informal control
mechanisms. Formal control mechanisms include the establishment and utilization
of rules, procedures, and policies to monitor and reward desirable performance.
Informal controls rely on the establishment of organizational norms, values, culture,
and the internalization of goals (Eisenhardt 1985).
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We refer to a more collaborative behavior of boards as ‘‘coaching’’, as coaches
are understood to help people to perform tasks. In line with existing research, we
define the coaching behavior of boards as ‘‘a direct interaction with a team intended
to help members to make coordinated and task-appropriate use of their collective
resources’’ in accomplishing the organization’s mission (Hackman and Wageman
2005, p. 269).
To employ the coaching and control categories of board behavior in concep-
tualizing CSO governance, we draw on the above-mentioned roles and responsi-
bilities of boards as framed by the most influential studies (Harris 1998; Herman and
Renz 1997, 2000; Houle 1989; Kramer 1981; Miller-Millesen 2003; Ostrower and
Stone 2006; Stone and Ostrower 2007). Board functions of like strategic planning
and budgeting, selection and review of CEO, and overseeing financial management
all represent control mechanisms, while definition and review of mission,
representing the organization in relation to key constituencies and public relations,
and establish a working relationship between board and staff constitute what we
define as coaching behavior of CSO boards (see Table 2).
The inherent tensions between controlling and coaching board behavior vis-a`-vis
management have been examined by Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003), who find
that organizations may experience a cycle of decline if boards put too much
emphasis on either controlling or collaborative behavior. Overemphasizing
controlling behavior can lead to a separation of responsibilities between the board
and management in CSO as well as defensive attitudes when managers are forced to
justify their strategies and actions. Rising distrust further exacerbates these
defensive postures, hampering board–management interactions and learning
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003).
Any exaggerated monitoring by the board could be perceived as mistrust by
managers and could thus damage their idealistic commitment to the organization.
Furthermore, constant control may erode executives’ self-efficacy, lowering their
aspirations and beliefs in their own ability (Lindsley et al. 1995). Increasing levels
of distrust may therefore reinforce defensive attitudes, impeding communication
and mutual learning, which again may lead to a circle of decline (Sundaramurthy
and Lewis 2003).
In contrast, in overly stressing collaboration, partnership, and coaching can lead
to groupthink, where management ideas and strategies are not adequately
scrutinized and challenged (Janis 1982). As executives and CSO board members
build strong social ties and mutual trust, pressures for cohesion grow. Both groups
feel obliged to cooperate to prove their commitment to the mission of the
organization. A vigilant board controlling the management of the organization
Table 2 Examples of coaching and control behavior within CSO boards
Control Coaching
Strategic planning and budgeting Definition and review of mission
Selection and review of CEO Representing the organization to key constituencies
Overseeing financial management Establish working relationship board–staff
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would then be perceived as a ‘‘betrayal’’ of the shared ideals and visions. The
combination of high collective efficacy and high identification with the organiza-
tion’s mission could raise the potential of counterproductive defenses. Consensus
seeking in an often purely volunteer-staffed board, smugness, complacency,
and entrenchment can lead to strategic persistence and organizational decline
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003).
Moreover, civil society organizations lack a straightforward measure of
managerial performance as profit in a for-profit firm. The lack of a common
system of reference and the existence of multiple, often implicit, bottom lines
(Anheier 2005) impedes a more vigilant controlling of management by CSO boards.
This can lead to strategic persistence in good times and a cycle of organizational
decline as performance deteriorates. Furthermore, Block and Rosenberg (2002) pose
the case of civil society organizations with a collaborative style of governance led
by founders. They suggest that founders gain informal power and dominate the
board, a phenomenon they call the ‘‘founder’s syndrome’’. Without vigilant
monitoring by members or detached outside directors, finally, can result in denial
and overconfidence which can prevent needed organizational restructuring (Johnson
et al. 1993).
The previous discussion highlights the vital need for a combination of control
and collaboration in CSO governance. Yet if one of these approaches becomes
overemphasized, the perils of groupthink or distrust can fuel reinforcing cycles
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003). However, from a paradox perspective, it has been
argued that embracing and balancing both approaches facilitate organizational
learning and adaptation (Lewis 2000; Poole and van de Ven 1989).
In acknowledging the paradox, i.e., the simultaneous need for controlling as well
as coaching behavior by boards in civil society organizations, we portray this
challenge by suggesting four ideal types of board behavior—informed by Schein’s
(1999) classical typology of consultation (Fig. 1). Echoing the need for
Fig. 1 Generic typology: coaching and controlling in CSO board behavior
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simultaneous, apparently opposed aspects in a relational interaction, Schein (1999)
provides a compelling typology in terms of client–consultant relationships. These
relationships are equally exposed to the challenge of simultaneously accounting for
dominant (controlling) and emergent (coaching) aspects between client and
consultant. In his famous work on organization development, Schein (1999)
distinguishes three forms of consultant–client relationships in the actual situation.
Drawing on this adjacent concept of Schein and being equally concerned with
relational interaction between two entities, in our case the board and the chief
executive officer (CEO), we employ Schein’s (1999) ideal types as a way to
describe specific CSO board and CEO relational configurations, with the board in
the doctor/consultant role and the CEO as the patient/client. For instance, while an
expert consultant typically holds not only the question but also the answer to the
client’s problem, a doctor–patient-like relationship is characterized by a limited
repertoire of remedies or treatments—determined by the doctor. A process
consultant aims at exploring question and answer with the client and in this way
has a limited, if any, stake in the actual solution. In mobilizing these three generic
consultant–client relationships metaphorically for our purposes, we suggest the
following. For instance, a high level of controlling as well as coaching behavior
exemplifies what Schein (1999) refers to as an expert attitude.
First, a CSO board acting in the ‘‘expert’’ role thus strongly performs control
functions (strategic planning and budgeting, selection and review of CEO, and
overseeing financial management) and coaching functions (definition and review of
mission, representing the organization to key constituencies and public relations, and
establishing a working relationship between board and staff) at the same time.
Second, a high level of control and a comparatively low level of coaching behavior
exemplify a board behavior that metaphorically emulates the aforementioned doctor–
patient relationship. Third, a high level of coaching combined with a comparatively
low level of controlling behavior exemplifies process consultation, whereby CSO
boards concentrate on establishing and maintaining a close collaboration between
management and board. Finally, a board that is characterized mainly by inaction on
both dimensions and hence performs neither coaching nor controlling tasks can be
referred to as an apathetic, and thus in most cases ineffective, board.
Field Analysis: Governance at Vox Liberorum (VL)
Given that CSO governance is empirically under-explored and theoretically under-
conceptualized, we conducted an in-depth, longitudinal interpretive case study
design (Yin 2008) which will be presented here as an illustration to our conceptual
model of board–CEO relationships in a CSO. We collected data through several
rounds of semi-structured interviews, field observations of workshops and meetings,
as well as archival data such as board meeting minutes, internal documents, and
public domain data in a non-governmental, European-based Childs rights organi-
zation we call VL (which is a pseudonym). We consider this empirical setting
indicative of our conceptual considerations above and thus address the question:
‘‘How can our conceptual model help to explain the development of governance in
Vox Liberorum?’’
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Research Setting
Over a period of 2 years starting in early 2008, we carried out this research in VL’s
board and executive team. VL supports programs of its international mother
organization around the world for the realization of child rights—focused on issues
such as child survival and development, basic education, gender equality, HIV/Aids
as well as child protection, and policy advocacy.
Thus, VL raises funds for specific projects all over the world and is among the
most well-known charities in this particular country (90% of the population know
the brand) and historically people have attributed values such as ‘‘fair’’,
‘‘trustworthy’’, or ‘‘effective’’ to the organization.
VL has 95 full-time employees and about 8000 active volunteers who operate in
local offices throughout the country. Legally constituted as a non-profit association,
VL’s ten non-executive, voluntary board members are nominated and elected in the
members’ assembly of the association and typically but not necessarily cover a wide
range of societal domains such as politics, business, law, academia, and media. The
managing director (MD) of the national headquarters has a full-time position and is
accountable for VL’s operations and all salaried staff.
In late 2007, VL’s otherwise flawless image was challenged by allegations of
misconduct that eventually proved to be false and unfounded, as a series of
independent investigations showed. Yet, the damage to its image was done and
resulted in a substantive decline of about 20% in yearly donations. Based on public
domain data, we understand that these developments were based in dissent about the
organization’s strategy and policy between the MD and the chairman of the board.
We started to work empirically within the organization only when these two actors,
and subsequently the entire board, had been replaced by a new board and an interim
MD had taken office. Our initial role was to assist the organization in revising and
developing a vision statement for the organization to provide salaried and volunteer
staff with direction and guidance. With respect to research, we engaged with the
organization in a collaborative mode of inquiry (Schein 1999) and after completion
of the dedicated project continued to gather data in a quasi-ethnographic manner.
Data Collection and Analysis
Our data covers the period from 1993 to 2010. The real-time data collection
extended over a period of more than 2 years (from May 2008 to August 2010) and is
comprised of semi-structured interviews, field observations of meetings, workshops
and informal interactions as well as archival data (see Table 4 in the Appendix for
details). In particular, we conducted a total of 29 interviews with key players of the
organization. The MD and his five reports were interviewed three times, first in
October 2008, then in July 2009, and finally again at the end of data collection in
August 2010. This real-time data allowed us to track the key protagonists’ changing
perceptions of governance over time. We also interviewed all members of the board
and the current MD.
The period from 1993 to 2008 was covered ex post by documents from the
respective time and by our interview partners reflecting on the events (see Table 5
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in the Appendix for details). To ensure data coverage in that period, we included
former organizational members in our interview sample such as the former and
long-term chairman of the board, former board members, and also the former and
the former-interim MD.
To further ensure that our sample included the most knowledgeable informants,
we asked our interview partners to nominate individuals. In this way, we included,
for example, the head of human resources in our interview rounds. Interviews lasted
about 70 min on average and were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. We
continued to conduct new interviews until additional interviews failed to dispute
existing or reveal new categories or relationships, i.e., until theoretical saturation
was achieved (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In our interviews, we used open and
personal questions and looked for anecdotes and examples (Mason 2002).
Participant observations were made during the vision development process from
October 2008 to July 2009, including ten workshops with board, top management
team, representatives of the employees, of the volunteers, and of the members.
Furthermore, we were granted access to the four board meetings, which took place
in the period from November 2009 to June 2010. During the workshops and board
meetings, one researcher took notes, which were later integrated with the official
meeting meetings written by the assistant to the MD.
Internal documents and archival data represent the third source of data for
studying paradoxical tensions (O’Connor 1995). We were able to use the official
internal (and confidential) minutes of board meetings, the slides from board
meetings, the strategic planning reports and slides, annual reports, and other
documents produced by the organization in the period from 2007 to 2010.
Through analysis we moved from raw data toward the identification of specific
governance tensions and their management. Our three-stage process followed
Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Miles and Huberman (1994). We developed cohesive
constructs and patterns by systematically and iteratively comparing data, emerging
categories, and existing literature on CSO governance and paradoxes.
First, we identified initial, broad themes in our data. Examining all interview and
workshop transcripts, we identified patterns and variance in the description of
governance tensions. We used language indicators for mixed messages such as:
‘‘tension’’, ‘‘yet’’, ‘‘but’’, ‘‘on one hand…on the other hand’’, ‘‘juggle’’, ‘‘balance’’,
‘‘there is a fine line’’, ‘‘how can you…and still…’’, and so on (Andriopoulos and
Lewis 2009; Lewis 2000). We also looked for contradictions within statements
made by the very same person. We then further categorized individually our data
using in vivo codes, terms that are derived directly from the language of the
interviewees (Strauss and Corbin 1998), or a simple descriptive phrase when an in
vivo code was not available. We compared these codes between three coders,
resolving disagreements through discussion, and generated first-order concepts
(Geertz 1983) which offered first insights into governance tensions and the
corresponding management efforts as described by the protagonists.
Second, in a team of two researchers we looked for links between and among the
first-order concepts to group them into second-order themes. We conducted this
interpretation process by sticking closely to the transcribed texts (Van de Ven and
Poole 1990, p. 321) and tried to discipline ourselves not to seek judgements on the
Voluntas
123
basis of our own theoretical assumptions. We presented these second-order themes
to our interview partners to reflect on, and where necessary refine, our findings
according to their comments to make sure our results are believable from the
perspective of the participants (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Furthermore, we enhanced
the confirmability of our findings by having one researcher take the role of a
‘‘devil’s advocate’’ (Lincoln and Guba 1985), and we actively searched for negative
instances that contradicted our prior observations.
Third, we aggregated the concepts created in the second stage to more abstract
dimensions and drew on existing studies on CSO governance and paradox to refine
our labels and understanding.
Table 6 in the Appendix exemplarily illustrates the structure and ordering of the
data from raw data from different sources (quotes from interviews, documents,
researcher protocols, and researcher notes) to more general, researcher-induced
interpretations (first-order concepts). The interpretations substantiated the subse-
quent grouping into second-order themes which emerged from the iteration process
between data, theory, and existing literature. Table 6 shows an excerpt from our
data analysis covering the period from February 2008 to August 2009 (doctor–
patient model).
Findings
The case of VL, which we will present in the following, is indicative and a salient
illustration of our conceptual model and our propositions developed in this article.
We have grouped the entire period in question analytically into four phases. Each
phase is distinct in terms of board behavior, which manifests itself primarily in its
interaction with the MD and his team of directors. Table 3 provides a synopsis of
our analysis in this respect. The names of the people involved have all been
anonymized of respect for the organization and the individuals.
Period 1: Growing Steadily Over More Than a Decade
When long-term chairman of the board, Albertus, resigned in 2005, he had been in
office for over 12 years, with Magnus as his MD. From early on in his term,
Albertus followed the daily work of the headquarters only from a distance since the
MD had a strong reputation inside as well as outside of the organization. As a
consequence, Albertus and all the board members fully trusted both Magnus’s
personality and his managerial abilities. Albertus and Magnus functioned extraor-
dinarily well as MD and chairman, according to our informants. Thus, looking back,
Albertus never felt disappointed by Magnus. Further evidence in this respect is
provided by the agenda of board meetings at that time, which mainly consisted of
children’s rights issues of all kinds. For instance, one expert reported about a visit to
a children’s right project in Africa, showing photos or videos. Topics concerning the
financial viability of the organization, such as the budget, the balance sheet, or the
annual report, let alone organizational structure and governance were discussed only
marginally. While all board members were very interested and had gained a certain
expertise in children’s rights, most of them were not involved in the managerial or
Voluntas
123
T
ab
le
3
B
o
ar
d
b
eh
av
io
r
at
V
o
x
L
ib
er
o
ru
m
P
er
io
d
R
el
ev
an
t
ev
en
ts
M
an
ag
in
g
d
ir
ec
to
r
C
h
ai
rm
an
an
d
b
o
ar
d
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
D
o
m
in
an
t
b
o
ar
d
b
eh
av
io
r
G
ro
w
in
g
st
ea
d
il
y
o
v
er
a
d
ec
ad
e
(a
p
p
ro
x
.
1
9
9
3
–
2
0
0
7
)
2
0
0
5
:
w
h
il
e
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
C
h
ai
rm
an
‘‘
A
lb
er
tu
s’
’
re
si
g
n
s,
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
M
D
‘‘
M
ag
n
u
s’
’
st
ay
s
in
o
ffi
ce
‘‘
M
ag
n
u
s’
’
‘‘
A
lb
er
tu
s’
’
an
d
‘‘
fr
ie
n
d
s’
’
L
o
w
le
v
el
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
an
d
co
ac
h
in
g
d
u
e
to
su
cc
es
s
an
d
sy
m
p
at
h
y
‘‘
A
P
A
T
H
Y
’’
2
0
0
5
:
N
ew
ch
ai
rm
an
‘‘
P
h
il
li
p
u
s’
’
is
el
ec
te
d
an
d
d
es
p
it
e
th
e
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
su
cc
es
s
st
ri
v
es
to
es
ta
b
li
sh
a
m
u
ch
cl
o
se
r
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
o
f
‘‘
M
ag
n
u
s’
’
‘‘
M
ag
n
u
s’
’
‘‘
P
h
il
li
p
u
s’
’
an
d
‘‘
A
lb
er
tu
s’
fr
ie
n
d
s’
’
(o
ld
b
o
ar
d
)
D
ra
m
at
ic
al
ly
in
cr
ea
se
d
le
v
el
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
d
u
e
to
‘‘
P
h
il
li
p
u
s’
s’
’
w
il
l
to
en
g
ag
e
in
o
p
er
at
io
n
s
re
su
lt
s
in
p
at
er
n
al
is
ti
c
‘‘
D
O
C
T
O
R
–
P
A
T
IE
N
T
’’
co
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
F
al
se
al
le
g
at
io
n
s
ch
al
le
n
g
in
g
V
o
x
L
ib
er
o
ru
m
’s
im
ag
e
(2
0
0
7
–
2
0
0
8
)
N
o
v
2
0
0
7
:
P
re
ss
p
ic
k
s
u
p
o
n
a
w
h
is
tl
eb
lo
w
er
’s
al
le
g
at
io
n
o
f
m
is
co
n
d
u
ct
F
eb
2
0
0
8
:
D
es
p
it
e
ev
id
en
ce
th
at
th
es
e
al
le
g
at
io
n
s
ar
e
u
n
fo
u
n
d
ed
,
‘‘
M
ag
n
u
s’
’
as
w
el
l
as
‘‘
P
h
il
li
p
u
s’
’
re
si
g
n
‘‘
M
ag
n
u
s’
’
D
O
C
T
O
R
–
P
A
T
IE
N
T
-m
o
d
el
(c
o
n
td
.)
R
is
in
g
to
th
e
ch
al
le
n
g
e
(2
0
0
8
–
2
0
0
9
)
F
eb
2
0
0
8
:
B
o
ar
d
n
o
m
in
at
es
‘‘
In
te
ri
m
u
s’
’
as
in
te
ri
m
M
D
A
p
ri
l
2
0
0
8
:
C
o
m
p
le
te
b
o
ar
d
o
f
‘‘
A
lb
er
tu
s’
fr
ie
n
d
s’
’
re
si
g
n
s
A
p
ri
l
2
0
0
8
:
G
en
er
al
as
se
m
b
ly
n
o
m
in
at
es
en
ti
re
ly
n
ew
b
o
ar
d
w
it
h
‘‘
A
tl
as
’’
as
it
s
ch
ai
rm
an
‘‘
In
te
ri
m
u
s’
’
‘‘
A
tl
as
’’
an
d
th
e
‘‘
re
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
ts
’’
(n
ew
b
o
ar
d
)
C
h
al
le
n
g
e
to
V
L
’s
p
u
b
li
c
im
ag
e
an
d
fu
n
d
s
le
g
it
im
iz
e
h
ig
h
le
v
el
s
o
f
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
as
w
el
l
as
co
ac
h
in
g
b
y
th
e
b
o
ar
d
th
at
en
te
rs
an
ex
p
li
ci
t
an
d
in
te
n
se
‘‘
E
X
P
E
R
T
’’
m
o
d
e
Ja
n
2
0
0
9
:
N
ew
M
D
‘‘
D
u
x
’’
re
p
la
ce
s
‘‘
In
te
ri
m
u
s’
’
‘‘
D
u
x
’’
C
o
n
so
li
d
at
in
g
an
d
re
n
ew
in
g
V
o
x
L
ib
er
o
ru
m
(2
0
0
9
-
o
n
g
o
in
g
)
S
ep
2
0
0
9
:
‘‘
D
u
x
’’
p
re
se
n
ts
co
n
v
in
ci
n
g
re
v
is
io
n
o
f
st
ra
te
g
y
an
d
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
re
d
es
ig
n
M
ay
2
0
1
0
:
‘‘
D
u
x
’’
re
si
g
n
s
‘‘
D
u
x
’’
‘‘
A
tl
as
’’
an
d
th
e
‘‘
co
m
eb
ac
k
m
at
es
’’
S
tr
at
eg
ic
g
u
id
an
ce
an
d
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
o
f
co
re
p
ro
ce
ss
es
le
ad
th
e
b
o
ar
d
to
lo
w
er
it
s
n
ee
d
fo
r
co
n
tr
o
l
w
h
il
e
m
ai
n
ta
in
in
g
a
h
ig
h
le
v
el
o
f
co
ac
h
in
g
‘‘
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
C
O
N
S
U
L
T
A
T
IO
N
’’
Voluntas
123
financial aspects of VL’s operations. In retrospect, this phase showed considerable
and steady growth, which resulted in a board behavior dominated by benevolent
sympathy vis-a`-vis Magnus and trust in his way to run the organization.
Conceptually, though, this represents us low levels of both coaching and controlling
behavior from the board’s side—an ideal type we referred to above as apathy.
In June 2005, long-term chairman of the board, Albertus, resigned after 12 years
in office and former politician Phillipus was elected as the new chairman. Based on
his experience as a government executive, Phillipus aspires to shape and manage
VL activities much more actively than Albertus. Phillipus quickly succeeded in
motivating his board to exert a much closer and tighter control of Magnus’
management—while offering little process guidance on how to implement their
ideas. Perceived by Magnus as interventionist or paternalistic board behavior, the
board showed a substantially increased level of control than before. For example,
the board started to play an active role in strategic planning and to closely monitor
activities such as financial management and fundraising. For Magnus and his
colleagues this changed board behavior represented a fundamental ‘‘culture change’’
in board–management relations and was perceived as ‘‘know-it-all meddling’’.
Earlier, we referred to such board behavior by drawing on a doctor–patient
metaphor, implying that the doctor shapes and monitors the healing process, i.e., the
management behavior of the MD.
Period 2: False Allegations Challenge VL’s Public Image
In November 2007, during the term of Phillipus and Magnus, the press picked up on
a whistleblower’s allegation of misconduct in VL. Although the investigations
conducted later indicated that the allegations were unfounded, they constituted a
significant challenge to VL’s otherwise flawless image as a trustworthy children’s
rights organization. While Phillipus and Magnus had previously had dissenting
opinions on how to manage the organization, this external challenge resulted in an
even more intensive controlling behavior by Phillipus and his board colleagues. As
a result, the different elements of the doctor–patient mode were pursued with even
more vigor than before, which eventually resulted in Magnus’ and Phillipus’ dual
resignation in February 2008.
Period 3: Rising to the Challenge
As a first gesture of recovery, the general assembly elected an entirely new board in
April 2008. The new board of directors consisted of renowned personalities such as
politicians, entrepreneurs, and media representatives. They elected Atlas, the
founder of a medium-size family business, as chairman. Atlas, a renowned
entrepreneur in Germany, suggested immediately appointing an interim MD,
Interimus, while searching systematically for a long-term solution. Interimus, a
former public sector administrator, focused his activities on stabilizing processes
and operations within VL and thus spent little time on strategic aspects. A major
achievement of Interimus during this phase, however, consists in the revising of VL
statutes so as to ensure a proper definition and division of roles between
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management director and board. Both the lack of managerial experience as well as
the dramatic decrease in donations of approximately 20% in conjunction with a
highly motivated board led to high levels of control as well as coaching behavior.
For example, as a consequence of the highly publicized ‘‘scandal’’, the newly
appointed board members undertook the task of restoring the flawed image of the
organization through an intensive public relations campaign and ‘‘lent’’ their
respected names and famous faces for interviews and public events to restore the
publicly tarnished image of the organization. Furthermore, they strategically
employed their personal connections to set up a ‘‘recovery team’’ (composed of
consulting, accounting, and law firms) to run pro bono projects for VL, which all
had the ultimate goal of re-gaining the general public’s trust. These coaching
activities of the new board members were conducted in close collaboration between
board, Interimus, and his top management team.
The coaching efforts were accompanied by a close monitoring of all managerial
activities by the board. Evidence of this is provided in the meeting minutes and our
interviews from that period, when mainly financial, formal, or managerial issues
including governance dominated the board meetings’ time and agenda. For instance,
the board did not only control the fundraising outcomes but more than once they
also offered to assist in the actual fundraising process. As Atlas, the chairman,
recalls of this period: ‘‘On the one hand we had to reestablish the confidence of
managers by continuously providing support, but at the same time the threats from
external stakeholders after the crisis and the pressure of being personally
accountable for any managerial misbehavior or economic setback almost forced
us to also exercise control.’’ Thus, conceptually speaking, this phase was
characterized by high levels of control and coaching behavior, which we earlier
labeled as an expert mode of CSO board behavior.
In January 2009, the search for a new MD resulted in the board appointing
‘‘Dux’’, a renowned former manager from the for-profit sector, as the new MD.
Despite his extensive experience in managing operations much larger in headcount
and revenues than VL, the board would not change its expert mode behavior vis-a`-
vis him for more than 6 months into 2009.
Period 4: Consolidating and Renewing VL
With the explicit mandate to consolidate and renew VL after a somewhat rocky
road, Dux was expected to bring a new and more ‘‘corporate’’ management style to
VL. Apart from stabilizing donations, his first project involved the design of an
explicit and formal strategy process in close cooperation with all members of the top
management team. Furthermore, he conducted a critical review of the organization’s
structure, adjusted it where he deemed appropriate and also invested in developing
the team of directors as well as the wider organization through a staff development
program. Strategic in his overall approach and professional in terms of managing
operations as well as leading the top management team, he started to convince the
board that a tight level of control would be counterproductive in the long term.
Given the proof of the validity of Dux’ approach, the board agreed to relax the level
of control but retained a critical level of coaching support both in managerial as well
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as mission-related terms. The close collaboration between board and staff members
established after the ‘‘scandal’’ in period 3 proved to be beneficial for the board–
management relationship and this also continued successfully in the fourth period.
Earlier, we referred to such a configuration of board behavior as the process
consultation mode.
In summary, we witnessed—as researchers and for the most part first hand—the
behavior of the various VL boards change through a number of more or less distinct
phases of different configurations and compositions in relation to the MD of the
organization. Figure 2 summarizes our analysis in this respect.
Discussion
We set out to explore how CSO governance, and especially the board–management
relationship, can be conceptualized in taking the simultaneous need for controlling
and coaching board behavior into account. The two main theories in CSO
governance, agency and stewardship theory, on their own do not fully explain CSO
board behavior, but each theory nevertheless emphasizes an important aspect. In
contextualizing this conceptual challenge with a paradox perspective, our key
premise has been that both the controlling and coaching dimensions are
simultaneously needed in the analysis to better understand CSO board behavior,
and the relation to the executive function—which is at the core of a paradox
perspective. Rather than conceiving of these two aspects as mutually exclusive, we
developed a typology of board behavior that comprises four ideal types (apathy,
expert, doctor–patient, and process consultation mode of board behavior). We have
Fig. 2 Synopsis of empirical board behavior: manifestations of coaching and controlling configurations
in Vox Liberorum’s board
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also, at the end of our article, exemplified this framework by drawing on empirical
illustrations from a longitudinal case study.
Our article thus makes a conceptual contribution in terms of providing an analytical
framework of CSO board behavior that takes the dual requirements of controlling and
coaching behavior into account. By offering a concept of governance that is informed
by a paradox theory perspective, we advance a subtler, and in our opinion more
adequate conceptualization of board governance, that aims to acknowledge the
delicate balance between these two different board roles and the simultaneous need
for bringing in the practice of supporting and controlling management into the
analysis of internal CSO governance. We suggest in our contribution four ideal types
of controlling/coaching constellations of board behavior, namely, the board as
‘‘doctor’’, the board as ‘‘expert’’, the board as ‘‘process consultant’’, and the apathetic
board. With our case study, we have illustrated how the behavior of a CSO board of
directors over time can switch from apathetic to controlling; to controlling and
coaching; and then finally to a situation where the behavior of the board could be
characterized by a coaching focus, in one and the same organization.
Thus, coaching and control are not mutually exclusive but complementary
approaches in CSO board behavior according to the specific circumstances the
organization is facing at a given point in time. Our results from the case study
illustrate how civil society organizations and their boards may embrace conflict and
trust, which we believe might promote diversity and shared understanding in board–
management relations at the same time. We do not argue that any of the identified
types of board behavior is superior to the other, with the exception of an apathetic
board, which is highly risky as our case study shows. Thus, the ‘‘ideal’’ board
behavior does not exist but rather depends on the specific situation of the
organization. Hence, boards of civil society organizations are well advised to
develop and maintain a ‘‘behavioral agility’’ to be able to control and coach the top
management team simultaneously and, we would argue, they also have to be
capable of switching from a control-focus to a coaching focus and back. Thus, the
composition of the board with people who have this agility is vital for effective
internal CSO governance.
While our case narrative followed a path from apathy to process consultation in
terms of our typology, this is by no means a conceptual proposition. Furthermore,
we should emphasize at this stage that our case does not try to suggest that process
consultation is the ideal mode of board behavior. Rather, we advance and advocate a
context-sensitive approach to CSO governance in terms of the following three
considerations:
1. Controlling and coaching behavior are not in contradiction with CSO board
effectiveness.
2. The amplitude or relative strength of each dimension and thus the overall mix is
subject to the specific organizational context that a particular civil society
organization might face.
3. However, when dealing with the composition of CSO boards one should make
sure to take these aspects into consideration by electing/staffing the board such
that capabilities for both controlling and coaching are available.
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Indeed, our argument is subject to—at least—the following limitations. Of
course, our own first-hand empirical support rests on an indicative case study that in
this context rather aims at illustrating our deductive line of reasoning, and we cannot
(and do not claim to) build theory from case data. Thus, with our illustration we
instead focus on exemplifying and demonstrating the different board behavior types
according to our typology and does not account for the transitions or changes
between the types. In a future study, however, when exploring such a dynamic line
of inquiry, we would need to track and explore antecedents triggering changes in
board behavior. At this stage, we consider the following questions and constructs
worthy of such investigation: How does a changing board composition or the hiring
of a new MD (and a corresponding change in leadership style) influence board
behavior, but also in which way increasing or decreasing levels of trust between
board and MD influence the behavior of boards. Finally, attention should be paid to
the role and importance of (external) stakeholders play, as well as how changes in
funds (e.g., donations) influence the control/coaching configuration in CSO
governance, as also addressed by Young in this volume.
Our findings, most generally, support the often voiced argument that the
composition of the board of directors is vital for a civil society organization to attain
its full potential (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001; Austin and Woolever 1992;
Balduck et al. 2010; Bradshaw 1992; Bradshaw et al. 1996; Brown 2002; Brown
and Iverson 2004; Callen et al. 2003, 2010; Herman and Renz 1999; Iecovich 2005;
Plambeck 1985). However, in many civil society organizations boards consist of
volunteers and thus the recruitment of suitable candidates is very difficult (Pearce
1993; Wise 1999). In reality, boards mostly consist of part-time, non-specialist
volunteers who behave in an idiosyncratic way and are not chosen according to a
known system of merit rankings (Houle 1989; Kreutzer and Ja¨ger 2011).
Furthermore, our case study confirms the key role and importance of the board–
executive relationship which several other authors already have pointed to (e.g.,
Allison 2002; Bradshaw 2002; Golensky 1993; Herman and Heimovics 1990;
Herman and Tulipana 1985; Tsui et al. 2004).
Our study partly answers the call for better analytical models to support more
qualitative research in the field of CSO governance so as to provide more a
contextual and holistic picture of CSO boards (Ostrower and Stone 2006). Our
findings also support Ostrower and Stone (2006) in another aspect: boards—and
particularly boards in civil society organizations—are heterogeneous entities that
defy easy generalization as there is no one best manner of board behavior.
To date, finally, studies on internal organization governance have hitherto almost
exclusively analyzed civil society organizations located in the United States,
Canada, or—more rarely—in the United Kingdom (Ostrower and Stone 2006). Rich
descriptions of European civil society organizations would therefore enhance our
understanding of governance challenges faced by a broader spectrum of CSOs.
Furthermore, future studies should also strive to contribute to the understanding of
the governance of international non-governmental organizations, a research field
that, despite the continuously expanding body of academic work, remains ‘‘terra
incognita’’, as also argued by (Martens 2002).
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Appendix on Data Collection and Analysis
See Appendix Tables 4, 5, and 6.
Table 4 Data source
Sources of data collection
Data type Quantity Source Original (intended) data
audience
Interviews 29 Informants
(Up to 4 interviews with key
players over time)
Analysis for this study
Observational data 70 h Ten vision development
workshops, including
informal pre/post
interactions (field notes by
one author)
Analysis for this study
Observational data 25 h Four board meetings,
including informal pre/post
interactions (field notes by
one author)
Analysis for this study
Official minutes of board
meetings (confidential)
6 (80
pages)
Minutes written by the
assistant to the MD,
approved by the MD and
the chairman of the board
Board members, record-
keeping of all board
discussions and decisions
Slides of board meetings 50 pages MD, middle managers,
external consultants
Board members
Strategic planning reports 200 pages MD, middle managers Strategic Planning
Committee, board members
Annual reports
(2000–2009)
150 pages Communication office Prospective and current
donors and volunteers, the
media, the general public
Strategic planning slides 50 pages MD, middle managers Strategic Planning
Committee, board members
Table 5 Timeline of data collection
Interviews 1 2 3
Participant 
observation 
vision 
developmt 
workshops
board 
meetings
documents
1993-
2007
May 08 Oct 08 July 09 Nov 09 June 10 Aug 10
retrospective data real time data
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